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Kinsley: Secondary Legislation

SECONDARY LEGISLATION
Jennifer M. Kinsley*

ABSTRACT
When legislative bodies seek to solve problems, they do so in one of
two ways: either they create entirely new regulatory frameworks that
contain novel solutions and outcomes, or they expand existing statutory
provisions by applying them in a different way. Increasingly, legislatures
are employing the latter approach to tackle today’s problems with
yesterday’s statutory solutions. This creative process of amending,
expanding, and transferring outdated statutes to address current issues is
called secondary legislation, and it poses unique challenges for existing
constitutional law. This is so because the existing standards for
determining when a law violates fundamental rights fail to account for
the existence of secondary legislation, instead measuring the
constitutional validity of an enactment based solely on the text before the
court. As such, in weighing the constitutionality of a secondary statute,
courts fail to consistently consider the historical meaning and application
of predecessor enactments.
This Article explores the concept of secondary legislation by examining
the ways in which legislatures repurpose existing law and by questioning
how the legislative recycling process fits within modern constitutional
jurisprudence. Focusing on the governmental interests at stake when a
legislative body borrows from old laws to create new ones, as well as the
tailoring or nexus that is required when a legislature departs from a prior
legislative tradition, this Article argues that the three primary
constitutional tests–-strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational
basis review–-should be adjusted to account for the modern-day
secondary legislation phenomenon.

* Professor of Law, Northern Kentucky University Salmon P. Chase College of Law; J.D., Duke
University.
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I. INTRODUCTION
When legislative bodies seek to solve problems, they do so in one of
two ways: either they create entirely new regulatory frameworks that
contain novel solutions and outcomes, or they expand existing statutory
provisions by applying them to new situations in a different way. The
former approach most commonly arises when either the perceived
problem or the cause of the problem is new and when the legislative
solution is the first attempt at addressing the issue. Many of the laws
regulating technology fall into this category,1 as do laws regulating the
environment,2 public health,3 and gender identity.4 As society advances
and creates unique problems—or comes to recognize problems for the
first time that it previously ignored—legislative bodies must respond with
brand new laws, written entirely from scratch.
More commonly, however, legislatures attempt to tackle today’s
problems with yesterday’s statutory solutions. I call this type of
legislative action secondary legislation. Legislatures adopt secondary
legislation when they amend, alter, or manipulate existing laws to apply
them in a new way rather than drafting entirely original legislation to
solve a current problem. This may occur when the legislature observes
that a law currently on the books has proven insufficient at curtailing a
particular societal issue and, as a result, needs to be tightened or
strengthened through a different style of enforcement. Take, for example,
the expansion of criminal penalties for drug dealing that were enacted
during the 1980s. The possession and sale of illegal narcotics had already
been criminalized, but the government responded to perceived increases
in drug use and addiction by simply amending the prison sentences
associated with existing legislation rather than enacting new legislation to
1. See, e.g., Reno v. Amer. Civil Lib. Union, 521 U.S. 844, 857-58 (1997) (describing the
Communications Decency Act, Congress’s first attempt to regulate content on the Internet).
2. For example, although now repealed, for a time the city of Raleigh, North Carolina banned
new garbage disposal installations to protect the city’s sewer systems from kitchen grease. See Adam
Hochberg, Raleigh, NC Bans New Garbage Disposals, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (March 17, 2008, 6:00 AM),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=88382453.
3. For instance, several cities have implemented so-called “sin taxes” on sugary sodas in an effort
to discourage their consumption. See, e.g., Karen Kaplan, Berkeley Sees a Big Drop in Soda Consumption
After Penny-Per-Ounce ‘Soda Tax,’ LOS ANGELES TIMES (Aug. 23, 2016, 4:20 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/science/sciencenow/la-sci-sn-soda-tax-works-20160823-snap-story.html.
4. For example, the state of North Carolina recently enacted the Public Facilities Privacy and
Security Act, known as the “bathroom bill,” in response to federal regulations that had the practical impact
of requiring schools to permit students to use the bathroom that corresponds to their gender identity. See
Franciscan Alliance, Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F.Supp.3d 660, 661 (D. N. Tex. 2016) (describing and later
enjoining Health and Human Services Department regulation that expanded Title IX discrimination
protection to gender identity); see also Public Facilities Privacy & Security Act (“House Bill 2”), 2016
N.C. Sess. Laws 3 (repealed 2017). The North Carolina law bans all individuals from using a public
restroom that does not correspond to their biological gender. Id.
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address the problem.5
Focusing on the government’s interest at both points in time—initial
adoption and amendment—reveals some interesting observations. For
example, as the “war on drugs” example demonstrates, the government’s
interest in addressing the target issue (in this case, combatting drug
addiction and abuse) tends to be relatively static over time. Stated another
way, the underlying rationale supporting both the initial and amended
laws tends to be, at its root, the same.6 As a result, when old laws are
updated to address new problems, the government’s motivation in
adopting the law seemingly transfers between the primary and secondary
legislation.
Secondary legislation may also be adopted, however, when the basis
for the initial law and the basis for the secondary law are different or even
incongruous. Unlike the government’s interest in expanding its drug
laws, in this instance the mere convergence of a legislative solution is not
in and of itself indicative of an identical governmental motive. What
works to solve one problem might also work to solve another, even though
the problems themselves are disparate and unique and even though the
interest the government seeks to advance is different. For example,
governments frequently require licenses to participate in certain
occupations—cosmetology and lawyering, for example7—but the reasons
why these professions are regulated are vastly different.8
The practice of adopting secondary legislation by recycling old laws
and by expanding, altering, or adjusting them in some way can therefore
be broken down into several categories: (1) transferred secondary
legislation, (2) combined secondary legislation, and (3) expanded
secondary legislation.
In the first category, transferred secondary legislation, a legislature
5. According to the Drug Policy Alliance, the number of people incarcerated for nonviolent drug
offenses in the United States rose from 50,000 in 1980 to over 400,000 by 1997. See A Brief History of
the
Drug
War,
DRUG
POLICY
ALLIANCE,
(last
visited
Feb.
6,
2019),
http://www.drugpolicy.org/issues/brief-history-drug-war.
6. While the outward rationale for adopting stricter drug laws appeared to be the “war on drugs,”
some scholars and commentators have noted that the drug policy laws of the 1980s and 1990s were in
some sense racially motivated. See, e.g., Aliza Cover, Cruel and Invisible Punishment: Redeeming the
Counter-Majoritarian Eighth Amendment, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1141, 1141-43 (Spring 2014) (discussing
racial disparities in drug enforcement and sentencing data).
7. See, e.g., K.R.S. 317A.020(2) (Kentucky law requiring a license to practice cosmetology,
esthetic practices, and nail technology); Ky. Sup. Ct. R. 2.010 (Kentucky rule requiring a license to
practice law and setting forth eligibility requirements for a law license).
8. Consider, for example, the legislative response to the fish pedicure, a treatment where the
client’s feet are submerged in a pool of water containing fish which eat dead skin. See Vong v. Aune, 328
P.3d 1057, 1058 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014) (describing fish pedicure procedure). The State of Arizona applied
its existing sanitation laws to prohibit fish pedicures in nail salons. Id. Other states have followed suit.
Philip Shishkin, Ban on Feet-Nibbling Fish Leaves Nail Salons on the Hook, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 23, 2009),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123776729360609465.
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may take an existing statute meant to address one type of problem and use
it to address a different one. This occurs, for example, when occupational
licensing schemes are applied to new professions, e.g. requiring Uber
drivers to obtain commercial driving licenses similar to taxi cab drivers.9
In this circumstance, the government’s interest in regulating the new
problem may not exactly mirror its interest in creating the legislative
solution initially. With respect to Uber and taxi drivers, for example, the
desire to ensure transportation safety exists in both contexts,10 but the
concerns around the migration of individual automobile insurance to parttime commercial use of a vehicle and the government’s interest in
ensuring proper background checks of moonlighting drivers and vehicles
are unique to Uber.11 As a result, in cases of transferred secondary
legislation, there may not be a perfect nexus between the government’s
concern and the legislative solution it employs.
In the second category, combined secondary legislation, legislatures
pull portions of scattered regulations together into a single,
comprehensive bill meant to address a different subject. This occurred,
for instance, when Congress enacted the Adam Walsh Child Protection
and Safety Act, which was designed to strengthen federal laws that protect
against and punish child exploitation and abuse.12 Prior to the passage of
the Adam Walsh Act, one federal law prohibited the possession and
distribution of child pornography and another required sex offenders to
register civilly, but these provisions were not necessarily perfectly linked
with a common purpose in a single bill.13 The Adam Walsh Act closed
this gap by providing comprehensive legal regulations applicable to all
stages of sex offense cases, from pretrial release through sentencing.14 In
this circumstance, the government’s interest in regulating sex offenses
against children supported both the initial scattered enactments and the
9. See Harriet Taylor, Uber and Lyft are Getting Pushback from Municipalities All Over the US,
CNBC (Sept. 2, 2016), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/09/02/uber-and-lyft-are-getting-pushback-frommunicipalities-all-over-the-us.html.
10. See, e.g., Jason Snead, Taxicab Medallion Systems: Time for a Change, THE HERITAGE
FOUNDATION (Dec. 10, 2015), https://www.heritage.org/transportation/report/taxicab-medallionsystems-time-change (describing health, safety, and welfare regulations of taxicab industry).
11. Owain James, Uber and Lyft are Lobbying States to Prohibit Location Regulation, MOBILITY
LAB (July 24, 2018).https://mobilitylab.org/2018/07/24/uber-and-lyft-are-lobbying-states-to-prohibitlocal-regulation/ (summarizing bases for local regulation of ride-sharing services and applications).
12. Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (2006) (codified as amended at 34 U.S.C. §§ 20911-20932
(2012)).
13. See United States v. Tom, 565 F.3d 497 (8th Cir. 2009) (“Congress enacted
the Adam Walsh Act in order to protect children from sexual exploitation and violent crime, to prevent
child abuse and child pornography, and to promote Internet safety. Its legislative history makes clear that
the Act was designed to be a comprehensive bill to address the growing epidemic of sexual violence
against children and to address loopholes and deficiencies in existing laws.”) (internal citations omitted).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Gardner, 523 F.Supp.2d 1025, 1027-28 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (describing
bail conditions component of Adam Walsh Act); Tom, 565 F.3d at 499-500.
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subsequent combined law.15
Third, with expanded secondary legislation, legislators may take an
existing statute intended to address a specific problem and expand or
amend it in some way to further target the same problem. The expansion
of sex offender registration laws to require online disclosure and to
prohibit residences near schools provides a prime example of this
category,16 as do the increasing restrictions tied to firearm licensure.17 In
all of these instances, legislatures enacting secondary legislation are not
functioning in a vacuum, but instead inherit the benefit (or the burden) of
the history, application, and outcomes of the initial statutory scheme.
When operating in this category, governmental regulation tends to
compound and expand upon itself, becoming progressively more
pervasive in its application to daily life.
This expanding legislative power is not necessarily, in and of itself,
problematic. Depending on one’s view on the proper role of government,
legislation should in theory be responsive to current societal problems and
should be adapted to reflect the values, knowledge, and understanding of
modern society.18 The fact that legislative bodies may update, revise, or
amend old laws to make them more relevant to current events may in
some sense be a necessary function of the legislature.
Where a concern arises, however, is how the judicial branch
approaches secondary legislation that impacts constitutional rights.19
Because the judicial branch acts as an important check of legislative
power,20 it is crucial that the courts properly adjudicate the validity of
15. See Tom, 565 F.3d at 516 (discussing habits of child pornographers who use online
distributions methods).
16. See, e.g., Does #1-5 v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696, 698 (6th Cir. 2016) (describing history of
Michigan sex offender registration laws, which were amended multiple times over two decades to include
an increasing array of restrictions).
17. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(3)(a) (requiring New York residents to apply for a
handgun license in the city or county of their residence); Rules of the City of New York Title 38 (setting
forth restrictions on handgun licensing, including requirement that individual seek only a place-based
permit, allowing handgun possession at that specific location, or a carry permit, allowing only transport
in public, but not both). The constitutionality of the New York City licensing scheme will be considered
by the Supreme Court in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 139 S. Ct. 939
(Jan. 22, 2019) (granting petition for certiorari).
18. For a discussion of how the seemingly obvious point that legislatures should respond to
contemporary problems might be the subject of contested debate, see Robert F. Blomquist,
Overinterpreting Law, 116 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1081 (2012).
19. Of course, legislatures enact statutes that do not touch upon constitutional rights all the time.
For example, laws that prohibit speeding, regulate the provision of employer retirement plans, set sales
tax rates, or define the duties and responsibilities of various government agencies typically do not
encroach upon or impact constitutional rights. While secondary legislation certainly occurs in these
contexts, this Article is concerned solely with secondary laws that burden constitutional rights and are
therefore infinitely more likely to wind up being subject to judicial review.
20. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803); Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 198
(2012) (“At least since Marbury v. Madison, we have recognized that when an Act of Congress is alleged
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both initial and secondary legislation, particularly where fundamental
rights are at stake.21 Yet the various tests that have developed for
assessing the constitutionality of a challenged statute do not explicitly
account for the fact that secondary legislation derives from prior statutory
enactments whose constitutionality is not challenged. This is a problem.
Courts cannot fulfill their constitutional obligation to review and, in
appropriate cases, strike down legislative action if they do not accurately
take into account the legislative process.
When a court assesses the constitutionality of a particular law, it does
so by weighing, with varying degrees of scrutiny, the government’s
interest in solving a problem against the burden imposed by the
regulation.22 Where a fundamental right is at issue, for example, courts
ask whether the government has a compelling interest in addressing the
perceived problem and whether the regulation is the least restrictive
means possible of achieving the government’s objective.23 In cases
involving lesser or less obvious rights, courts merely require that the
statute rationally advance a legitimate government interest.24 In none of
these instances does the court expressly weigh whether the initial
legislative regimes would have been sufficient to solve the problem being
addressed by the secondary legislation, how the government’s interest has
morphed or changed between the initial and secondary legislation, or why
the problem persists despite the government’s prior efforts to address it.25
Rather, every piece of secondary legislation, at least insofar as it is
analyzed under the existing constitutional framework, is treated on the
same footing as its predecessors if challenged in court. As such, courts
rarely assess, at least not explicitly, whether prior versions of a statute
were efficacious or what advantage new enactments further over prior
enactments.26 Instead, by making use of existing constitutional standards,
to conflict with the Constitution, it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is.”) (citation omitted).
21. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015) (discussing fundamental nature
of right to marry).
22. See, e.g., Judd Matthews & Alec Stone Sweet, All Things in Proportion? American Rights
Review and the Problem of Balancing, 60 EMORY L.J. 797, 836-37 (2011).
23. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2761 (2014).
24. See City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
25. This is not to say that some industrious or forward-thinking courts do not occasionally take
into account the full scope of legislature’s motive in a particular case. They do. See, e.g., Does #1-5 v.
Snyder, 834 F.3d 696, 705-06 (6th Cir. 2016) (comparing current Michigan sex offender registration law
to its predecessor for purposes of determining whether statue was punitive, and therefore barred by the Ex
Post Facto Clause, or civil in nature). But, as will be discussed later in this Article, the basic tests
promulgated by the Supreme Court for assessing the legality of legislation restricting constitutional rights
do not explicitly require lower courts to consider the legislature’s migrating or merged motivation.
26. See, e.g., NW Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Houston, 352 F.3d 162 (5th Cir. 2003) (evaluating
constitutionality of amended and expanded adult business zoning restrictions without regard to whether
initial buffer zones were sufficient to ameliorate perceived secondary effects of such businesses).
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courts directly assess only whether the current version of the law is
sufficiently justified and appropriately crafted to achieve its objective,
meanwhile disregarding what came before the current version of the
law.27
This approach to secondary legislative regulations creates distinct
problems for constitutional jurisprudence. First, by analyzing secondary
legislation without regard for initial enactments, courts implicitly elevate
and give undue weight to the government’s interest in solving the
problem. This is so because, under the interest prong of the various
constitutional tests, courts take into consideration the legislative history
documenting the existence of a problem, but do not weigh whether the
government’s previous legislative attempts have ameliorated or
intensified the current governmental concern. In other words, nowhere in
the analysis is the government required to demonstrate why its
compelling, substantial, or reasonable interest persists despite prior
attempts to address the problem. As a result, the government’s interest is
given too much deference and too little scrutiny, creating the possibility
that a previously sufficient interest will be used to justify ever-expanding
regulation over time. Second, by analyzing the nexus between a
secondary enactment and the potentially inflated interest without regard
to the history of the prior enactments, courts give the legislative branch
too much power to experiment with the regulation of fundamental
rights.28 Indeed, at no point in the analysis is the government required to
prove the efficacy of its prior enactments or to be held accountable for
why they did not work. Rather, courts merely focus on the present
legislation, without regard for the fuller history that led to its passage.
The Supreme Court has, to some extent, implicitly acknowledged this
issue without giving any indication as to how its traditional constitutional
frameworks should flex and bend when encountering secondary
legislation. Consider, for example, Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt,
in which the Court weighed whether a Texas law requiring certain
surgical center standards and the presence of a hospital transfer agreement
for licensed abortion clinics imposed an undue burden on the right of a
female to obtain an abortion.29 The law was not the state’s first attempt
to regulate abortion access; its predecessor required that abortion clinics
27. The Supreme Court acknowledged as much in Shelby County, Ala. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529,
536 (2012), when it said of the Voting Rights Act: “the Act imposes current burdens and must be justified
by current needs.”
28. The Supreme Court has acknowledged instances in which it gives legislatures a free pass to
experiment with the regulation of activities involving protected constitutional freedoms. See, e.g., City
of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 439 (2002) (observing that, in addressing the
secondary impacts of sexually oriented businesses, “municipalities must be given a reasonable opportunity
to experiment with solutions”) (internal citations omitted).
29. 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300-01 (2016).
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have a working agreement, rather than a formal contract, with a nearby
hospital to provide care in emergencies.30 In determining whether the
new law imposed an undue burden, the Court limited its inquiry to the
sufficiency of the legislative history supporting the new law.31
Significantly, in striking down the transfer agreement requirement, the
Court observed that “there was no significant health-related problem that
the new law helped to cure.”32 It thus focused on the period of time when
the initial law was in effect but before the secondary legislation was
adopted to assess the government’s interest. Because the government
could not demonstrate that a threat to women’s health persisted in the face
of the predecessor law, the Court held that the new transfer agreement
provision was unjustified and unconstitutional.33
The Court’s opinion in Whole Women’s Health reveals why courts
should expressly acknowledge a challenged law’s status as a secondary
enactment before assessing its constitutionality. Of particular note is the
Court’s implicit requirement that the government address efficaciousness
before imposing a more burdensome restriction on protected
constitutional rights. Because the Texas law already in effect was
apparently effective at protecting women’s health and minimizing
emergencies, there was no new problem for the state to solve.34 As Whole
Women’s Health reveals, secondary legislation must therefore address a
new, persisting, or intensified problem to be valid, but the Court’s
constitutional framework fails to expressly incorporate this requirement.35
Against this backdrop, this Article explores the concept of secondary
legislation and how the various constitutional tests should be adapted to
address the secondary regulatory phenomenon. Part I of the Article
discusses the concept of secondary legislation, both generally and
categorically, and offers concrete examples of how legislatures expand,
amend, amalgamate, and recycle old legislation to solve new problems.
Part II of the Article then discusses the various levels of constitutional
scrutiny that apply to legislative enactments, including the variants of
strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis review that exist
in different constitutional contexts. Part III questions how secondary
legislation fits into the existing constitutional tests, paying special
attention to the interest and tailoring prongs, and proposes adjustments to
30. Id.
31. Id. at 2300-04.
32. Id. at 2311.
33. Id. at 2314 (“The record contains nothing to suggest that [the new abortion law] would be more
effective than pre-existing Texas law at deterring” risky or unlawful abortions).
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S.Ct. 1656, 1668-69 (2015) (discussing
compelling government interest in restricting judicial campaign solicitations based on underinclusiveness
and overinclusiveness but without regard to the novelty of the problem being addressed).
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the constitutional standards that serve to take the history of a secondary
piece of legislation into account. Part IV includes context-specific
examples of how the revised constitutional standards would work when
applied to secondary legislative efforts and observes areas in which the
Supreme Court has already implicitly followed these revised standards.
The Article concludes that the government interest test should be applied
with greater scrutiny in cases of secondary legislation and that the
tailoring test should include an efficacy component that weighs the impact
of prior legislation.
II. CATEGORIES OF SECONDARY LEGISLATION
The process by which modern-day legislation is drafted, vetted,
debated, adopted, and enacted is complex and at times confusing.36 In
today’s legislative environment, no law comes into fruition—whether it
is proposed at the federal, state, or local level—without going through a
number of back-and-forth drafts, committee hearings, and likely
stakeholder reviews.37
The procedure can become even more
complicated when the approval of two chambers is required, each of
which may vote to add or subtract provisions of the bill.38 The result is a
tangled web of moving parts, all of which must come together to form
consensus in order for a proposed statute to become effective law.
Perhaps because of the complexity of the current legislative process,
legislatures do not always start from scratch in tackling a particular
problem or issue.
Rather, legislatures frequently borrow from
predecessor statutes, in both overt and nontransparent ways, to restructure
regulatory regimes. In this way, secondary legislation functions as the
statutory corollary to judicial common law. In the same way that casebased jurisprudence is constantly expanding and building upon itself,39
36. For an interesting and informative discussion of the formalities of how a bill becomes law and
the little-known “enrolled bill” doctrine, see Ittai Bar-Simon-Tov, Legislative Supremacy in the United
States?: Rethinking the “Enrolled Bill” Doctrine, 97 GEO. L.J. 323 (2009). Ronald Krotoszynski also set
forth a detailed analysis of the Congressional law-making process and the constitutional requirements that
govern it in Deconstructing Deem and Pass: A Constitutional Analysis of the Enactment of Bills by
Implication, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1071, 1087-92 (2013).
37. See, e.g., How Laws are Made and How to Research Them, https://www.usa.gov/how-lawsare-made (last visited Feb. 10, 2019).
38. See,
e.g.,
Alan
Lowenthal,
How
a
Bill
Becomes
Law,
https://lowenthal.house.gov/legislation/bill-to-law.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2019) (describing conference
committee process following passage of non-identical bills by the House and Senate).
39. To be fair, those who approach common law with a natural law perspective, and who believe
that judges merely describe and name laws that already existed as an innate component of human virtue,
may not see a resemblance between statutory creation and judicial common law. For a more detailed
discussion of this philosophy and the ways in which it may depart from the theory of secondary legislation
espoused in this Article, see John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust, Chap. 1 and 3 (1981). See also
Robert P. George, In Defense of Natural Law (1999).
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the broad array of federal, state, and local laws grows, broadens, deepens,
and changes over time in a variety of categorical ways.40
Understanding the reasons why a legislative body may elect to amend
existing laws rather than draft new ones, as well as the ways in which
legislatures borrow from other laws in the legislative process, is critical
to fully considering the impact of the secondary legislation phenomenon.
Three general types of secondary legislation exist: transferred, combined,
and expanded. Each type is characterized by a different relationship
between the initial enactment and the secondary law, leading to unique
observations about the government’s interest for the secondary
legislation.
A. Transferred Secondary Legislation
Transferred secondary legislation exists when a legislative body
transfers an existing statute or regulation that applies in one context to an
entirely different set of circumstances. In these instances, the legislature
may expand the existing statutory scheme to apply to a wider group of
people, companies, or situations, or may adopt a new statute, carbon
copied from the old one, that applies to the expanded issue. By way of
example, in the wake of crowdsourced transportation apps like Uber and
Lyft, municipalities have explored the possibility of requiring
crowdsourced drivers to obtain commercial driver licenses or to follow
existing taxi cab regulations.41 Another example, although administrative
rather than legislative in nature, is the Federal Aviation Administration’s
recent expansion of the unmanned aircraft system registration
requirement to include small unmanned aircraft, popularly known as
drones.42
In cases of transferred secondary legislation, the government’s interest
in the initial law and the target of the second law may or may not be the
same. In the case of Uber drivers, for example, it is likely that the same
concern for passenger and roadway safety that supported the initial
commercial driver’s license law also supports requiring special licenses
for crowdsourced drivers.43 But the government has additional interests
in regulating Uber—namely the potential gap in insurance coverage when
40. Viewing the body of legislative enactments this way, as a web and not a strand, begs the
questions: why does our judicial system treat a statute as a stand-alone regulation, rather than in the
context in which it was adopted, when exercising its judicial review function? Why are statutory laws not
treated by the courts in the same expansive way as common law? These questions drive the discussion of
constitutional test revision in Section IV, infra.
41. See Taylor, supra note 9.
42. 14 C.F.R. § 48.1 (requiring registration of drones with the Federal Aviation Administration
effective Dec. 16, 2015).
43. See Snead, supra note 10.
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private vehicles are used for part-time commercial purposes and the desire
to promote fair competition between market participants44—that depart
from its interests in regulating the taxi cab industry. Similarly, when the
FAA transferred its prior unmanned aircraft requirement to drones, it was
likely acting to protect the safety and shared use of common airspace.45
But, given the rapidly increasing recreational and commercial use of
drones and the lack of a robust study of its potential dangers, the FAA
was likely also seeking to discourage drone ownership in the short term
until a full legislative solution could be debated and implemented. The
FAA may also have been acting to protect the privacy interests of people
on the ground, whose activities and likenesses may, unbeknownst to
them, be recorded by drones, a wholly unique interest from the reasons
supporting the regulation of aviation more broadly.46
As the Uber and drone examples demonstrate, it is not difficult to
envision scenarios in which the governmental interest furthered by an
initial enactment is not the same as the government’s interest in
transferring an existing law to a new problem. As such, the mere fact that
initial legislation is transferred to a secondary concern tells us very little
about the nature of the government’s interest in the second statute. The
source of that information would be limited to the legislative record
around the transferred enactment, rather than embedded in the initial
legislation itself.
B. Combined Secondary Legislation
Combined secondary legislation exists when a legislative body pulls
portions of different existing laws that target or relate to the same problem
and combines them into a single bill that comprehensively addresses that
problem. This approach largely tracks the legislature’s perception of the
severity of the issue being targeted. As the problem grows in severity
over time, so does the required legislative response. While at first laws
about other topics may contain only minor regulations that apply in
narrow circumstances, amalgamating these disparate, scattered statutory
provisions eventually leads to the conclusion that the problem warrants a
44. Our View: Uber Should Follow Taxicab Rules, IOWA CITY PRESS-CITIZEN (Apr. 1, 2016, 2:38
PM),
https://www.press-citizen.com/story/opinion/editorials/our-view/2016/04/01/uber-iowa-cityshould-follow-taxicab-rules/82520654/.
45. See, e.g., The FAA’s Drone Rules Are Effective Today, FED. AVIATION ADMIN.,
https://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=86305 (summarizing FAA Part 107 regulations on nonrecreational use of drones).
46. For a full discussion of how drones operate and place individual privacy rights at risk, see
Jeramie D. Scott, Drone Surveillance: The FAA’s Obligation to Respond to the Privacy Risks, 44
FORDHAM URB. L. J. 767 (2017), and Matthew Koerner, Drones and the Fourth Amendment: Redefining
Expectations of Privacy, 64 DUKE L.J. 1169 (2015).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2019

11

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 88, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 3

112

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 88

more targeted focus. The legislature then acts to combine the scattered
provisions into a comprehensive law.
This process was exemplified when Congress enacted the Adam Walsh
Act, a broad bill designed to more precisely define and punish offenses
related to child exploitation and pornography.47 Prior to enacting the Act,
Congress already prohibited certain criminal offenses related to child sex
abuse and child victimization, and also required a narrow range of sex
offenders to sign onto a national registry as a collateral consequence of
their convictions, but through two different provisions of the United
States Code. Reacting to the highly-publicized abduction and murder of
6-year-old Adam Walsh,48 Congress enacted a single piece of legislation,
which included expanded criminal penalties and collateral consequences,
designed to punish sex offenses against children in a more comprehensive
and serious way.49
Unlike transferred secondary legislation, combined secondary
legislation reveals at least some information about the government’s
interest in both the old and new laws. First, because the initial legislation
contained only smaller subparts of the comprehensive bill, one can
assume that the initial law was supported by a narrower governmental
interest. In addition, because the legislature has acted to combine smaller
regulations into a larger, more focused enactment, it is also fair to assume
that the government’s interest is stronger or more emergent with respect
to the secondary legislation than it was with the prior enactments. These
observations are displayed in the Adam Walsh Act, which was enacted to
address a heightened concern for protecting children following several
highly publicized cases involving child victims.50
In the case of combined secondary legislation, the persistence of the
underlying issue in the face of the government’s initial enactment reveals
something significant about the government’s ongoing interest. Because
additional combined legislation is necessary, in the government’s view,
to combat the underlying problem the legislature is trying to solve, the
adoption of a new law signals to some extent that previous legislative
approaches were ineffective. The serious sex offenses against children

47. Adam Walsh Child Protection And Safety Act Of 2006, H.R. 4472, 109th Cong. (2d Sess.
2006); see also Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act Law and Legal Definition, US LEGAL,
https://definitions.uslegal.com/a/adam-walsh-child-protection-and-safety-act/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2019).
48. Adam Walsh’s father John was a prominent proponent of the expanded legislation. He created
and starred in the popular television show “America’s Most Wanted” to raise awareness of crimes against
children and to increase apprehension of sex offenders. Meg Grant, John Walsh, Host of ‘America’s Most
Wanted,’ on What He’s Learned from Life and Loss, AARP THE MAGAZINE (Aug./Sept. 2013),
https://www.aarp.org/entertainment/television/info-08-2013/john-walsh-americas-most-wanted.html
(last visited May 20, 2019).
49. United States v. Tom, 565 F.3d 497, 499 (8th Cir. 2009).
50. Id.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol88/iss1/3

12

Kinsley: Secondary Legislation

2019]

SECONDARY LEGISLATION

113

that formed the impetus for the Adam Walsh Act are a prime example. In
that case, Congress’s previous attempts to deter the sex abuse of children
by implementing criminal penalties and a public registry were not
effective at eliminating child abuse altogether. As a result, when adopting
combined secondary legislation, the government maintains an ongoing
interest at least in part because its predecessor solutions were ineffective.
C. Expanded Secondary Legislation
Expanded secondary legislation, the most common and easiest to
identify form of secondary legislation, exists when the legislature amends
existing laws in a way that broadens their scope or application. In this
regard, expanded secondary legislation is the most straight-forward type
of secondary legislation because it arises with respect to a single statutory
enactment, and both the initial and secondary legislation are codified in
an identical location in the legislative code.51 The legislative body merely
takes an existing law already on the books and alters or amends its
provisions to make it more relevant to contemporary problems. In such
instances, the governmental interest underlying the amendments is
typically obvious and very closely aligned with the interest that justified
enacting the law in the first place. But it is possible that the government’s
interest has not really intensified, as was the case in Whole Women’s
Health, and that the government is merely relying upon the same set of
facts that justified its initial enactment to support increasingly
burdensome regulation.
One recent example of this type of legislation lies in the expanding
licensing and regulatory requirements for gun ownership.52 As highprofile mass shootings have been on the rise, certain states and
municipalities have sought to restrict the types of firearms eligible for
individual ownership, have lengthened wait periods and purchase
conditions for gun ownership, and have tightened laws that disallow
certain individuals from owning or possessing guns.53 In these cases, the
government’s interest in expanding gun regulation is not difficult to
discern. Prior to the era of modern mass shootings, governmental bodies
still regulated firearm possession, although through less stringent

51. Our system and study of law at least implicitly acknowledge the importance of this legislative
trajectory because it is tracked by digital research databases like Westlaw and Lexis and is reported in the
USCA. For an example, search for “18 USC 2257” in Westlaw and scroll to the bottom of the legislative
text to see a listing of the various amendments to the statute over time.
52. For a survey of handgun licensing laws and their justifications, see GIFFORD LAW CENTER,
https://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/gun-owner-responsibilities/licensing/ (last visited
Feb. 16, 2019).
53. Id.
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regulatory schemes.54 They did so presumably to protect the public from
the misuse of dangerous weapons, an interest they still seek to further in
restricting firearm ownership to a higher degree. While the interest may
intensify or morph slightly over time, in instances of expanded secondary
legislation, the government purports to pursue a substantially similar
interest in both its initial and secondary activities.
But it is equally possible that the government may seek to expand
existing legislation without any new impetus at all. Take, for example,
adult business zoning. It is not uncommon for municipalities to enact
zoning laws that require adult bookstores and strip clubs to be located
only in certain confined areas of town or to maintain a specified buffer
zone from sensitive zones like schools, churches, and residences.55 But,
at certain times, cities will either increase the buffer zone distance
requirement or expand the range of businesses they consider as adult in
nature without any change of circumstance on the ground.56 As this
example illustrates, legislatures will at times amend a law despite the fact
that the law is working well at addressing the initial underlying concern.
D. The Interplay of the Categories of Secondary Legislation
Secondary legislative action need not be cabined into a single
subcategory. Rather, secondary legislation often involves a combination
of one or more of the approaches discussed above. A prime example is
the Adam Walsh Act, a combined secondary law, in which Congress also
amended many of the provisions in the new law, making the law an
example of expanded secondary legislation.57 However, determining the
categorical composition of a particular secondary law is important for
assessing how the law would be analyzed under the three primary
paradigms guiding judicial review of the legislative branch. This is
particularly true in terms of identifying the nature of the government’s
interest in its various legislative enactments.
With transferred secondary legislation, the government’s interest is
likely not identical between the initial and subsequent law. With
combined and expanded secondary legislation, the government’s interest
is likely similar between the two laws, with the interest in the subsequent
law being heightened in part because the government’s prior solutions
54. See Michael A. Bellesiles, Firearms Regulation: A Historical Overview, 28 CRIME & JUST.
137 (2001) (summarizing historical trends in gun regulation from colonial times to modern day).
55. See, e.g., For the People Theaters of N.Y., Inc. v. City of New York, 79 N.E.3d 461, 464 (N.Y.
2017) (describing New York City regulation of adult businesses).
56. Id.
57. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act Law and Legal Definition, US LEGAL,
https://definitions.uslegal.com/a/adam-walsh-child-protection-and-safety-act/ (last viewed Feb. 10,
2019).
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proved to be ineffective at mitigating the societal problem at issue. But
the Supreme Court’s tests for analyzing the constitutionality of
Congressional legislation treat transferred, combined, and expanded
secondary legislation on identical footing with initial legislation, thereby
failing to take into account the full picture of the government’s asserted
interest.
III. JUDICIAL SCRUTINY OF LAWS IMPACTING CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
When courts assess the constitutional validity of statutes that infringe
upon constitutional rights, they almost always do so by balancing, inter
alia, two key components: (1) the government’s interest in restricting the
right (the “interest prong”), and (2) the degree of fit or tailoring between
the regulation and the government’s stated interest (the “tailoring prong”).
The strength of the right at stake and the nature of the government’s
restriction of the right dictate the rigor of the analysis.
A. Strict Scrutiny and Fundamental Rights
Courts employ strict scrutiny—which operates as a presumption of
unconstitutionality—in cases where either a fundamental right is violated,
or the law strikes an unjust balance involving members of a suspect
class.58 Strict scrutiny analysis requires that the law be justified by a
compelling government interest of the highest order and that the interest
is achieved in the most narrowly tailored way possible. Examining the
courts’ treatment of key fundamental rights reveals important
observations about the point in time at which the government’s interest is
assessed. Without regard to the secondary nature of legislation impacting
the right at stake, courts typically look solely to the legislative record for
the challenged enactment and not any predecessor legislation to
determine the constitutionality of the law at issue.
1. First Amendment Right of Free Speech
Laws that violate the various rights enumerated in the First
Amendment59 are only constitutional if they survive strict scrutiny.60 In
the context of free speech, laws must not ban or act as a prior restraint on
expression on the basis of its content and must also necessarily advance a
compelling government interest and be the least restrictive means of
58. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1268 (2008).
59. For example, the rights to speech and assembly.
60. See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015) (requiring strict scrutiny for all
content-based restrictions on speech).
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advancing that interest to survive constitutional review.61 As a result, at
the outset, it is critical to determine the precise nature of the government’s
interest in suppressing speech and whether the government is pursuing a
content-based agenda in limiting expression.
As discussed above, laws restricting free speech are rarely written from
scratch. Rather, Congress and its sister legislatures in the states tend to
borrow from old solutions—licensing laws, criminal prohibitions, and the
closure of quasi-public speech forums, to name a few—to address current
perceived problems in the free speech marketplace. One instructive case
on this point is United States v. Stevens.62 At issue in Stevens was the
constitutionality of a federal law that criminalized the creation, sale, or
possession of certain depictions of animal abuse.63 The law was passed
primarily to target the sale of so-called “crush videos,” which sexualize
the torture of animals by depicting women in high heels slowly crushing
animals to death, but Stevens was prosecuted for selling dogfighting
videos online.64 Both the crushing of animals and dogfighting were
illegal in all fifty states, evidence of the universal belief that the abuse of
animals inflicts intolerable harm.65
In attempting to justify the law, the government in Stevens argued in
favor of what the Court termed a “startling and dangerous” proposition:
that depictions of animal cruelty, while not historically excluded from the
protections of the First Amendment, could now be wholly excised from
free speech coverage.66 The government equated expressions of animal
cruelty to other categories of speech, like child pornography and
obscenity, that are so lacking in societal value as to fall outside the
protection of the Constitution.67 And, more broadly, the government
suggested that the value of any particular category of expression—not just
depictions of animal abuse, but any speech deemed by the government to
be unlawful—could be balanced against is harm to society to assess the
scope of the First Amendment.68
Given its parallels to bans on child pornography and obscenity,
Congress’s prohibition of depictions of animal cruelty was, in effect, a
piece of transferred secondary legislation. By arguing that the identical
balancing and historical tests that justified other laws banning speech
applied equally to crush videos, the government was in a sense relying
61. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Ent. Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000); United States
v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).
62. 559 U.S. 460 (2010).
63. Id. at 464.
64. Id. at 465-66.
65. Id. at 466.
66. Id. at 469-70.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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upon its interests in the initial legislation to support the transferred
secondary legislation. But the Court emphatically rejected this
proposition.69 The Court refused to separate that speech which is
constitutionally protected from that speech which is not covered by the
First Amendment solely on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis.70 While
the Court acknowledged that speech which is categorically unprotected
generally lacks serious value and inflicts serious harm, it noted that those
qualities were descriptive, rather than objective.71 Moreover, the Court
declined to carve out a new category of unprotected expression, despite
the government’s invitation to do so.72
By cabining its inquiry to the government’s interest in the transferred
legislation, the Court missed an opportunity to engage in a comparative
analysis of the asserted compelling interest, weighing the interest in the
secondary legislation against the interest in the original legislation. The
Court rejected the government’s attempt to impose a cost-benefit analysis
on the right of free expression,73 thereby skirting the question of whether
the stated legislative purpose in removing offensive expression regarding
animal abuse from the public discourse was compelling. Had the Court
instead weighed the interest underlying the initial child pornography
legislation—the protection of children from revictimization as images of
their sexual abuse spread from possessor to possessor—against the
interest in prohibiting depictions of animal abuse, which was limited to
the promotion of sanitized public communication, the Court likely would
have reached the same result, but in a manner that acknowledged the
existence of secondary legislation.
2. Voting Rights
Citizens of the United States arguably have a fundamental right to vote
in public elections,74 yet it is undeniable that voting discrimination
against people of color persists even today.75 Congress attempted to
remedy the undeniably rampant historical racial discrimination in voting
when it adopted the Voting Rights Act of 1965.76 One provision of the
Act required states which utilized a reading test, good moral character
standard, or other voting barrier that imposed a disparate impact on racial
69. Id.
70. Id. at 470-72.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. U.S. Const. amend XV.
75. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 536 (2013) (“voting discrimination still exists; no one
doubts that”).
76. Id. at 537.
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minorities to submit to additional federal regulation of its election
processes.77 Under those regulations, the offending states were not
permitted to make changes to their elections procedures without federal
preclearance from either the Attorney General or a three-judge panel in
Washington.78 The preclearance provision expired in five years, but was
renewed by Congress in 1970 for five years, in 1975 for seven years, in
1982 for 25 years, and in 2006 for another 25 years.79 A county located
in Alabama, a historically offending state subject to the preclearance
requirement, sued to invalidate the 2006 extension.80
The Court considered the question in Shelby County, Ala. v. Holder.81
In assessing the constitutionality of the Act, the Court clearly understood
its secondary nature, heavily discussing the voting discrimination
problems that supported the adoption of the Act in the first place.82 But
the Court did something interesting in weighing the validity of the 2006
extension against the original justification for the Act in 1965. It noted,
first, that the Act had appeared to all but eliminate racial disparity in
voting: “Nearly 50 years later, things have changed dramatically . . . In
the covered jurisdictions, voter turnout and registration rates now
approach parity. Blatantly discriminatory evasions of federal decrees are
rare. And minority candidates hold office at unprecedented levels.”83
The Court attributed these advancements to the Act, an achievement
Congress itself acknowledged when it passed the 2006 extension.84
77. Id.
78. Id. at 537-38.
79. Id. at 538-39.
80. Id. at 536, 539.
81. See id.
82. Id. at 537-39, 545-46. The Court had previously upheld the Voting Rights Act against a
constitutional challenge in 1966 after it was initially enacted. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S.
301 (1966). The Shelby County Court described that ruling as follows:
In 1966, we found these departures from the basic features of our system of government justified.
The “blight of racial discrimination in voting” had “infected the electoral process in parts of our
country for nearly a century.” Several States had enacted a variety of requirements and tests
“specifically designed to prevent” African–Americans from voting. Case-by-case litigation had
proved inadequate to prevent such racial discrimination in voting, in part because States “merely
switched to discriminatory devices not covered by the federal decrees,” “enacted difficult new
tests,” or simply “defied and evaded court orders.” Shortly before enactment of the Voting Rights
Act, only 19.4 percent of African–Americans of voting age were registered to vote in Alabama,
only 31.8 percent in Louisiana, and only 6.4 percent in Mississippi. Those figures were roughly 50
percentage points or more below the figures for whites. In short, we concluded that “[u]nder the
compulsion of these unique circumstances, Congress responded in a permissibly decisive
manner.”
Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 545-46 (internal citations omitted).
83. Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 547.
84. Id. at 548 (“There is no doubt that these improvements are in large part because of the Voting
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Given that the Act had proven to be efficacious, the Court then required
the government to demonstrate that it had an ongoing interest in
eliminating voting discrimination when it adopted the 2006 law. The
Court therefore implicitly segregated the government’s interest in its
initial enactment and the government’s interest in the expanded secondary
legislation.85 Because the government could demonstrate no ongoing
compelling interest in light of the original Act’s success, the 2006
extension was declared unconstitutional.86
The Court’s decision in Shelby County provides a roadmap for how and
why constitutional scrutiny should expressly acknowledge the secondary
legislation phenomenon. Governments will attempt from time to time to
rely upon outdated evidence and old solutions to solve current problems,
if they exist, or to justify heavy-handed legislation based on improper
regulatory motives. The Court’s existing constitutional tests simply do
not account for this phenomenon, although they should.
B. Intermediate Scrutiny
When laws target a class that is not race-based, but is derived from a
historically suspect classification,87 or when laws do not ban but merely
burden the exercise of a fundamental right,88 courts apply intermediate
rather than strict scrutiny. Under intermediate scrutiny, the government
need only maintain a substantial, rather than a compelling, interest and
enact a law that is narrowly tailored to further that interest.89 In addition,
when laws restrict free expression, the government must also show that
sufficient alternative avenues for the presentation of speech must remain
after the regulation is enforced.90

Rights Act. The Act has proved immensely successful at redressing racial discrimination and integrating
the voting process.”) (emphasis in original); Id. at 547 (“Those conclusions are not ours alone. Congress
said the same when it reauthorized the Act in 2006.”).
85. I categorize the 2006 extension as expanded secondary legislation because, as the Court
observed, it extended the initial coverage period significantly and imposed additional burdens on
historically offending states. See id. at 549.
86. Id. at 551-53. Notably, the Court rejected the government’s attempt to rely upon solutions
derived from data collected in 1965 to justify identical and expanded solutions in 2006. Id. (“Coverage
today is based on decades-old data and eradicated practices…. But history did not end in 1965 . . .
Congress—if it is to divide the States—must identify those jurisdictions to be singled out on a basis that
makes sense in light of current conditions. It cannot rely simply on the past.”).
87. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-24 (1982) (describing
intermediate test for gender discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause).
88. See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (establishing intermediate scrutiny
test for time, place, and manner restrictions on speech).
89. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796 (1989).
90. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
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1. Lesser Speech Restrictions91
a. Time, Place, and Manner Analysis
In contrast to laws that ban or criminalize speech on the basis of its
content, which are presumptively unconstitutional, laws that merely seek
to regulate the delivery of free speech in some lesser way are reviewed
with intermediate and not strict scrutiny. Known as time, place, and
manner restrictions, these types of laws are constitutional if they are
content-neutral, advance a substantial governmental interest, are narrowly
tailored to that address that interest, and keep open ample alternative
channels of communication.92 In this context, the reduced burden on the
government to demonstrate a substantial rather than a compelling interest
makes it more likely that the interest used to justify a challenged
regulation will be derivative of the initial justification. It is therefore
critical that courts separate original legislation from secondary legislation
to appropriately identify the vitality of the government’s current
objective.
In a typical time, place, and manner case, the government’s asserted
interest is unrelated to the expression at issue.93 For example, in United
States v. O’Brien, the seminal First Amendment case on intermediate
scrutiny, the government argued that its interest in issuing and
maintaining records related to the draft supported its prosecution of a man
who destroyed his draft card in protest.94 The objective of the law, if the
government was to be believed, therefore had very little to do with
prohibiting speech, but instead was focused solely on the administration
and efficiency of the draft. This is dissimilar from laws that ban speech
outright, which the government typically attempts to justify by reference
to the categorical lack of value of the speech itself.95
Given the potential that the government may engage in the pretextual
censorship of unpopular speech by relying upon a justification that is
unrelated to speech, it is critical that courts correctly pinpoint the interest
that is actually advanced by a particular piece of legislation. When
secondary time, place, and manner legislation is added to the mix, that
observation matters all the more.
91. The term “lesser speech restrictions” refers to governmental regulation of speech that does not
amount to an outright ban and is therefore reviewed under an intermediate scrutiny test. See, e.g., Ward,
491 U.S. 781.
92. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
93. Of course, this must be the case, because laws that target expression because of their content
run the risk of being invalidated as impermissibly content-based. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct.
2218 (2015).
94. 391 U.S. 367, 377-78 (1968).
95. See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010).
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b. Eminent Domain
Although not a variant of intermediate scrutiny per se, the
governmental interest required to support a taking of private property for
a public use approximates the substantial governmental interest portion
of the intermediate scrutiny test. In the context of property takings, the
government may not appropriate physical or personal property for its own
use.96 Where the government does take private property, it must both
offer just compensation to its owner and act in pursuit of a public
purpose.97 Whether a government’s asserted objective is a sufficiently
public purpose to justify a taking is substantially similar to the question
of whether a government’s interest is sufficiently substantial to burden a
fundamental right.
The Court’s opinion in Kelo v. City of New London98 offers a prime
example. At issue in Kelo was the taking of private residences and other
investment properties, none of which were blighted or in serious disrepair,
to facilitate a Connecticut town’s economic development plan.99 In
concluding that the plan constituted a public purpose, the Court credited
the legislative body’s determination that removing the homes and
replacing them with commercial businesses was in the municipality’s best
interests.100 In so doing, the Court acknowledged that legislative
solutions change over time as conditions in society and on the ground
change as well.101 “Viewed as a whole, our jurisprudence has recognized
that the needs of society . . . have evolved over time in response to
changed circumstances.”102
Times indeed change, and the law sometimes changes with them. In
such circumstances, the courts should recognize that current legislation is
derivative of its predecessors and should consider the full slate of
legislative action in determining whether a law is constitutional.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL SCRUTINY OF SECONDARY LEGISLATION
Despite the Supreme Court’s apparent understanding that laws should
be responsive to current, not prior, problems, the existing tests for
96. Tahoe–Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
324 (2002).
97. U.S. Const. amend. V; Penn Central Transp. Corp. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978).
98. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
99. Id. at 475-76.
100. Id. at 483-84 (noting that the city’s “determination that the area was sufficiently distressed to
justify a program of economic rejuvenation is entitled to our deference”).
101. Id. at 482.
102. Id.
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measuring the constitutional validity of a statute fail to take into account
the full history and complexity of secondary legislation. More
specifically, in considering whether government regulations violate a
constitutional right, courts consistently apply an identical level of scrutiny
to initial and subsequent regulations without taking into account previous
regulatory activity. This is true regardless of whether the court is applying
strict or intermediate scrutiny or deferential rational basis review.
A. Governmental Interest Test
Regardless of whether a statute implicates strict or intermediate
scrutiny or lesser rational basis review, the first task a court must
undertake in considering a statute’s constitutionality is to determine the
nature of the government’s interest. The court asks: What is it the
government is looking to accomplish? What concern does the
government have and what is the basis for that concern? It is essential
that the interest be properly defined, because the interest prong is the
benchmark against which the remaining constitutional standards—and
the tailoring prong in particular—are assessed.
This task proves difficult enough in cases where the government
approaches the legislation in question with a fresh brush. Indeed,
competing schools of thought have arisen on the question of statutory
intent and the respective roles that legislative history, societal context,
critical legal theory, the competing meaning of language, and the text of
the statute itself play in determining why a legislative body chose to enact
a particular law.103 But the task is all the more complicated when the
question of legislative intent involves two or more separate legislative
records, supporting two or more separate pieces of legislation, as is the
case with secondary legislation. Perhaps because it may be difficult to
determine what role the legislature’s intent in adopting a predecessor
statute should play, if any, in defining the government’s interest in a
secondary law, courts have never articulated an interest test that
accommodates secondary legislation.
This is problematic. Because secondary legislation, particularly of the
combined and expanded varieties, arises almost always from an
intensified or heightened governmental response, there is a risk that courts
will view the second law to be more justified than it actually is. This is
so because the government may attempt to use, as it did in Shelby County,
the full legislative record from both the initial and secondary enactments

103. For a comprehensive overview of the various schools of thought in the field of statutory
interpretation, see Jonathan R. Siegel, Judicial Interpretation in the Cost-Benefit Crucible, 92 Minn. L.
Rev. 387 (Dec. 2007).
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to justify its interest.104 Without identifying the derivative status of the
new legislation, courts may be too quick to accept the government’s vast
body of evidence without questioning whether the secondary law is truly
supported by its history.
More importantly, in some instances, secondary legislation may only
be necessary or desirable because the government’s initial attempt to
solve the problem was not successful. When this is the case, the
government does not retain a heightened or more serious interest in
addressing the underlying problem than supported its initial enactment,
although it may argue that it does. Rather, the necessity of secondary
legislation merely demonstrates that the government was ineffective in its
first solution. But it is easy to confuse this failure with a more emergent
need to act. The government may appear justified in its need to respond
with a more burdensome regulation, when in reality all it needs to do is to
try something different, not something more.
In other instances, the government may attempt to rely upon the exact
set of facts and circumstances that justified its initial enactment in
adopting more burdensome regulations. This occurs most frequently, as
it did in the Shelby County voting discrimination case, in the case of
expanded secondary legislation.105 In the absence of new evidence
demonstrating that there is a necessity for additional legislation, the
government’s interest should be deemed insufficient, given that its initial
solution appears efficacious. After all, if the government has been
effective at solving the problem, it maintains no ongoing interest in
regulating the conduct or behaviors that caused the problem in the first
place. Therefore, the Court’s implicit holding in Shelby County—that the
government must justify continuing interests at each enactment of
secondary legislation—should be explicitly applied in similar cases
addressing First Amendment, due process, and other protected
constitutional rights.
One approach to the secondary legislation problem would be to
require courts to assess the strength of the government’s interest based on
the entirety of the legislative record for both the initial and secondary
enactments. Where the initial legislative solution failed, courts should
say so. Where the initial legislative solution was supported by a different
or more robust interest, courts should say so as well. In fact, the Supreme
Court implicitly employed a similar approach with respect to abortion
rights in Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt, a case questioning the
constitutionality of a Texas law requiring abortion providers to maintain

104. See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 565 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“After
considering the full legislative record . . . .”).
105. See, e.g., id. at 559 (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion).
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hospital transfer agreements.106 In Whole Women’s Health, the Court
rejected the notion that the state of Texas retained a sufficiently
compelling interest in keeping abortions healthy and safe in light of the
fact that it had previously amended its laws to restrict abortion access. In
other words, because the state was unable to show that a mortality risk
persisted even after more stringent regulations were enacted, the state
lacked a sufficiently compelling and new interest to justify its secondary
legislation.
As a result, efficacy should be a necessary component of the
government interest inquiry. Where the government has previously
legislated to solve a problem, and the challenged enactment is merely
secondary to that initial legislation, the government’s interest is
necessarily tethered to the success or failure of its previous initiative.
B. Tailoring Test
The phenomenon of secondary legislation also makes it difficult to
accurately assess the degree of tailoring, or the nexus, between the
government’s stated interest and the burden of the right at stake. An
efficacy component also addresses this particular problem as well. More
specifically, before determining whether the new law promotes the
government’s interest in a constitutionally justifiable way, courts should
consider the prior law and its impact on the issue that the government was
initially attempting to address. Rather than questioning whether the
secondary law is tailored to the government’s newly asserted interest,
courts should instead focus on the degree to which the prior law was
effective.
Take, for example, the regulation of Uber drivers, which is derivative
of pre-existing regulations of taxi drivers. Prior to the existence of Uber
and other crowdsourced transportation services, local governments
routinely required special licenses of taxi cab drivers.107 To test the
efficacy of these regulations, government entities licensing taxis could
presumably draw upon their experience, anecdotal evidence, and data, if
available, to demonstrate a nexus between licensing programs and
improved passenger safety. Requiring new regulations of Uber drivers to
be justified by the government’s own experience in licensing cab drivers
ensures that secondary legislation is appropriately and narrowly tailored
to the government’s objective.

106. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
107. See, e.g., ATLANTIC CITY, N.J., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 233-2 (imposing strict licensing and
operational regulations upon owners and drivers of taxi cabs).
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V. SAMPLE CASE STUDY
A hypothetical scenario based on real-life regulation is illustrative of
how a more comprehensive view of secondary legislation is appropriate.
Municipalities frequently adopt zoning regulations designed to keep
sexually oriented businesses away from sensitive uses in the community
(i.e. schools, residences, and places of worship). Because the right to
disseminate erotic expression is protected by the First Amendment, cities
may only adopt such laws when they are targeting the documented
secondary effects of adult businesses and not the content of the material
sold inside.108 In demonstrating that it is targeting the secondary effects
of adult businesses and not punishing them for their expression, cities are
permitted to rely upon evidence from other jurisdictions showing that
crime rates, property values, and neighborhood cleanliness are negatively
impacted by the presence of these businesses.109 It is impermissible,
however, for municipalities to act solely out of a desire to prevent an adult
business from opening its doors in their town.110
To protect their citizens from the perceived secondary effects of
sexually oriented establishments, cities frequently adopt buffer zones that
prohibit such businesses from operating within a specified number of feet
of sensitive uses.111 It is not uncommon for cities to later expand the
distance requirement, at times to be responsive to changing physical
landscapes on the ground. For example, shifting residential patterns
might necessitate expanding a 1,500-foot buffer zone to a 2,500-foot
buffer zone to ensure that adult businesses are not congregating where
people tend to live.112
Contemplate a scenario, however, where a municipality expands its
buffer zone absent any factual support. For example, consider that the
city of Anytown adopted an ordinance in 1995 that prohibited adult
businesses from operating within 1,500 feet of churches, schools, and
residences. In doing so, it relied upon studies from other jurisdictions
demonstrating that crime rates increase and property values decrease in
108. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); City of Los Angeles v. Alameda
Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (2002).
109. See, e.g., Encore Videos, Inc. v. City of San Antonio, 330 F.3d 288 (5th Cir. 2003) (discussing
permissibility of reducing crime and stabilizing property values as justifications for adult business zoning
ordinance); World Wide Video of Washington, Inc. v. City of Spokane, 368 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2004)
(identifying pornographic litter and public lewdness as secondary effects of adult businesses the
government is permitted to regulated consistent with the First Amendment).
110. See, e.g., Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
111. See, e.g., For the People Theaters of N.Y., Inc. v. City of New York, 79 N.E.3d 461, 464 (N.Y.
2017) (describing New York City buffer zone ordinance, which required adult uses to locate no closer
than 500 feet from enumerated incompatible uses).
112. See, e.g., Phillips v. Borough of Keyport, 107 F.3d 164, 169 (3d Cir. 1997) (describing
legislative history of local reduction of adult business buffer zone from 500 feet to 300 feet).
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areas that are immediately adjacent to strip clubs. Fast forward to 2001,
when three new council members who comprise a majority of the council
are elected. The new council members review the identical studies
presented to the Anytown council in 1995 and conclude that the initial
buffer zone was insufficient to protect the public from the secondary
effects of adult uses. The Anytown council therefore passes a new
ordinance requiring adult businesses to locate more than 5,000 feet from
sensitive uses.113
If the expanded buffer zone faces constitutional challenge, how should
the courts apply intermediate scrutiny to the 2001 ordinance? Can
Anytown demonstrate that it retains a substantial interest in targeting the
secondary effects of adult businesses based solely on the 1995 legislative
record, or is it required to submit additional proof that an expanded buffer
zone was needed in 2001? Must Anytown show that its 1995 ordinance
was ineffective at addressing the identified secondary effects before
expanding its legislation to be more heavy-handed? And how are the
courts to determine if the 2001 ordinance is narrowly tailored, given that
Anytown clearly felt a less rigorous regulation was sufficient to solve the
problem in 1995?
This example illustrates the unique conundrums that arise when courts
assess the constitutionality of secondary legislation and the ways in which
the government interest and tailoring prongs of the three forms of
constitutional scrutiny can be tweaked to produce a more comprehensive
treatment of legislative validity. In some instances, the modified
approach will result in legislation being struck down that previously
would have been upheld, but in others it will result in legislation
remaining in full force where it may have been declared unconstitutional.
Critics of this approach may argue that adjusting the interest and
tailoring prongs of constitutional scrutiny for secondary legislation places
too high a burden on the government to justify both its current and prior
enactments. But, considering the previously-asserted government interest
and the efficacy of the prior regulation may actually make it more likely
that a statute will be upheld in its secondary form. This is particularly
true where the first legislative attempt at regulation results in a statute
being struck down and where the legislature adopts a more tailored
secondary law. Take, for example, the Child Pornography Prevention
113. This hypothetical is based upon a similar fact pattern that occurred in New York City. In 1995,
the city adopted an adult business zoning regulation based on a study that highlighted the depressed
conditions in Times Square, purportedly caused by the presence of seedy strip clubs and adult bookstores
in the area. In 2001, the city expanded its 1995 ordinance to include a broader range of businesses,
including those which dedicated less than 40 percent of their floor space or business purpose to adult
entertainment. The City relied upon no new evidence of secondary effects to justify the expanded 2001
ordinance. The validity of that enactment is currently facing constitutional attack in federal court. See
689 Eatery Corp. v. City of New York, No. 1:02-cv-4431 (S.D.N.Y. filed Jun. 12, 2002).
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Act, which was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition.114 Following the Free Speech
Coalition decision, Congress amended its law to more narrowly define
the range of suspected or possible child pornography to be targeted, and
this law was upheld as constitutional.115 As a result, proper adjudication
of the government interest and tailoring prongs of the various
constitutional tests is more, and not less, likely to generate legislative
enactments that both solve contemporary problems while also respecting
individual rights.
VI. CONCLUSION
In today’s complex legislative world, rarely is a law drafted and
enacted completely from scratch. Rather, the practice of creating
secondary legislation by amending, expanding, combining, and
transferring old laws into new ones has become the legislative norm. Yet
our system of judicial checks and balances has failed to adjust to this new
standard and still maintains constitutional tests that were created to
adjudicate only first legislative attempts to solve problems. These tests
are largely unworkable when called upon to address a tangled legislative
web in which statutes morph and broaden into one another over time, as
is the case with secondary legislation. This is particularly true when
courts attempt to assess the government’s interest in adopting new
legislation derived from prior enactments and supported by a potentially
new goal. This is also true with respect to a court’s tailoring inquiry,
which examines the effectiveness of a challenged secondary law without
regard to the efficacy of its predecessors.
In assessing the constitutionality of secondary legislation, courts
should expand their interpretation of the government interest and tailoring
prongs to include the full legislative and pragmatic history of the prior
laws on which the secondary law rests. Indeed, secondary legislation does
not arise in a vacuum, and nor should its scrutiny. Instead, judicial review
should look to the complete legislative history of a secondary enactment,
with its infinite benefits and lessons, to determine the law’s viability.
The Supreme Court implicitly employed this approach in its recent
voting discrimination and abortion rights decisions, but without
intentionally adjusting its stated constitutional tests for analyzing
restrictions on fundamental rights. Given its propensity to weigh the past
against the present, the Court should amend the standards for
constitutional review to outwardly embrace a law’s secondary status and
114. 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
115. See United States v. Williams, 535 U.S. 285, 290-91 (2008) (upholding constitutionality of
PROTECT Act amendments to Child Pornography Prevention Act).
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adjust its analysis accordingly.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol88/iss1/3

28

